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In this review article we
AQ1
explore the growing body of literature on the subject of trust
in the field of international relations. We argue that the international level represents a
unique challenge for trust research. This is so because some of the most pressing
10 problems facing the world today require the development of trusting relationships
internationally. In addition, the international environment is structurally different from
domestic or personal relations on which much of the trust literature has focused so far.
We identify three main strands of trust literature in international relations – rationalist,
social and psychological. We not only note the contributions these have made to
15 understanding the role of trust internationally, but also highlight areas where more
research is needed. Particularly, we argue that this includes theorising processes of
trust-building, the identification of trusting relationships and the development of a
normative case for trust among states AQ2.
Keywords: international relations; anarchy; states; trust-building; security
20 communities
The international level presents the greatest challenge to trust studies. The most pressing
problems facing humanity, be they climate change, environmental degradation or nuclear
proliferation with the concomitant threat of a nuclear war, cannot be solved within the
confines of individual nation states and demand international cooperation. These
25 problems fundamentally foreground the existence of trust and distrust among states, the
ways in which trust can facilitate or hinder states’ encounters, and the possibility of
establishing and maintaining trusting relationships among large collectives. It is of crucial
importance to understand the role of trust in these dynamics from both theoretical and
practical points of view. In short, a strong case exists for why the emerging field of trust
30 studies should take a substantial interest in international relations and, vice versa, why the
field of international relations ought to incorporate and develop insights generated by
trust researchers.
Even a cursory look at the bilateral or multilateral relationships between states reveals
a range of statements by world leaders concerning both trust and distrust. These
35 expressions suggest that they are aware of the significance of trust in solving these major
problems, yet also understand its risks. For instance, prior to the Copenhagen Climate
Change Summit in 2009, the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon articulated
the need ‘to build trust between developing and industrialized countries’ (Ban, 2009).
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Shortly after his election in June 2013, the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani spoke about
40 the ‘many ways to build trust’ with the West (‘Rouhani vows to “ build trust” with West’,
2013). And yet, even before the tentative deal concerning the limits on the Iranian nuclear
research was reached in November 2013, the US Secretary of State John Kerry went out
of his way to stress that ‘nothing we do [with Iran] is going to be based on trust’
(Steinhauer, 2013).
45 In addition to these proclamations, we can observe formal or informal declarations of
trusting relationships between specific states, or, on the contrary, denunciations of other
states as untrustworthy. We can also find instances where states routinely cooperate with
each other to the benefit of all concerned, but at the same time harbour distrust over
whether other states involved might engage in free-riding or even defect from the
50 agreement. Though almost all states maintain active militaries to repel external threat,
suggesting a general degree of distrust of at least some states, we can simultaneously
identify groups of states among whom trust is so high and trusting relationships so robust
that war between them has become unthinkable.1 All this reinforces our claim that the
dynamics of trust and distrust play an important role in how states relate to and interact
55 with each other.
Despite this, the subject of trust within the study of international relations, both
theoretically and empirically, is still at a nascent, if rapidly developing, stage. With rare
exceptions, until about a decade ago the international relations scholarship by and large
overlooked trust as an explanatory factor in the relations between states. Likewise,
60 trusting relationships rarely feature as something to be explained, irrespective of the
numerous calls from practitioners regarding the importance of trust-building. Some
scholars, such as John Mearsheimer, argue that this oversight is purposeful, claiming that
there is ‘little room for trust among states because a state may be unable to recover if its
trust is betrayed’ (Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 12). This is allegedly due to the unique
65 characteristics of the international system, which makes the establishment and sustenance
of trusting relationships between states much more difficult than between persons or
organisations acting within the domestic sphere. Nonetheless, even Mearsheimer’s
sceptical assessment does not completely rule out the possibility of trust among states.
It merely implies that it is rarely present.
70 Increasingly, scholars in the field of international relations have come to pay greater
attention to the concept of trust and the role it might play in interstate affairs. Authors
have found inspiration in various strands of the literature produced by trust researchers
and have sought to apply it to a range of phenomena in international politics. Therefore,
one goal of this review essay is to provide a thorough and critical overview of this
75 growing literature. The flow in this exchange of ideas has, so far, been rather
unidirectional from trust studies to international relations. We believe that drawing the
focus of trust researchers to the international level will generate two-way traffic. Thus,
another objective of this article is to highlight and explore the particular challenges and
barriers posed to trust and trusting relationships by the structure of the international
80 system. In this way, we want to encourage trust researchers to think further about the
scope of applicability of their conceptual and theoretical tools. Finally, our third aim is to
suggest some possible directions for future research at the intersection between trust
studies and international relations.
The review essay reflects our objectives and proceeds in three parts. In the first part,
85 we explain why trust has so long been ignored within international relations theory and
why the international level poses unique challenges to the study of trust and trusting
relations. In particular, we examine the problem of anarchy within the international
2 J. Ruzicka and V. Keating
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system, which has led many to conclude, or perhaps assume outright, that trusting
relations are impossible in international politics. Second, we show how scholars have
90 attempted to introduce the concept of trust into the study of international relations, a trend
that has recently picked up in pace dramatically. We trace diverse conceptual sources in
trust research and highlight strengths and weaknesses of various applications to the study
of international politics. The third section articulates several questions concerning trust
that we consider to be the most pressing at the international level and which researchers
95 both in international relations and in trust studies should tackle. They pertain to the
processes of trust-building, the ways in which it could be demonstrated whether globally
or at least regionally trusting relationships are becoming more robust, and finally the
normative desirability of trusting relationships among states.
The overarching idea behind this review article is to facilitate interdisciplinary
100 research between international relations and trust studies. Neglecting the international
level would be a missed opportunity for the latter, while the former needs to think more
carefully about the transformative potential that the concept of trust holds for dealing with
thorny issues of international politics. The mutual engagement between the two fields
promises strong potential for theoretical innovation as well as practical impact.
105 Trust in a condition of anarchy AQ3
The largest obstacle facing scholars who wish to theorise about trust in international
politics stems from the idea of anarchy. Within the field of international relations, anarchy
denotes the absence of an overarching authority which could enforce rules, laws and
contracts. This lack of a central arbiter for disputes and conflicts fundamentally
110 differentiates the international system from domestic systems which are hierarchical
due to the presence of a recognised authority, the government.
The idea of anarchy magnifies the impact of uncertainty about the motives of others.
In such a structural setting, each state is formally the equal of all the others entitled to act
in its best interest. The result is, as Kenneth Waltz (1979, p. 88) puts it, that ‘none is
115 entitled to command; none is required to obey’. Though states might sign treaties with
each other, these do not have the same ordering force as domestic contracts do. States not
only legislate for themselves the rules that they wish to obey, but in general are also ‘the
supreme authority for interpreting and giving concrete meaning to their own legislative
enactments’ (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 286). Theorising relations between states under the
120 condition of anarchy is the primary focus to most international relations theories.
The implications of the idea of anarchy for the study of trust in international politics
have long been accepted as obvious: anarchy prevents, or at least severely hinders, the
formation of trusting relationships. This assumption is often accompanied by the belief
that states must mistrust each other. Hoffman (2006, p. 35) summarises the argument
125 noting that in the absence of a legitimate central power, the possibility that other states
might act opportunistically, and have a good chance of getting away with it should they
choose to do so, destroys any expectations of trustworthiness. The consequences of such
potential opportunism are severe. Misplaced trust could lead to a state being dominated
by others or, in extreme cases, to its disappearance. Even when states do not fear external
130 domination, the state leadership could face increased domestic political competition
arising from the political fallout of the misplaced trust. Either way, leaders are therefore
wary to trust in the first place (Hoffman, 2006, p. 8). Thus, despite sharing a mutual
interest in solving a dispute, states might not cooperate because they will fear the other
might take advantage of their trusting attitude.
Journal of Trust Research 3
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135 The fear of misplaced trust can be modelled as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Unless the
other state’s compliance can be monitored and a timely warning of cheating received,
states will be wary of entering into agreements for fear of receiving the sucker pay-off
(Axelrod, 1990; Larson, 1997, p. 7). Sometimes the monitoring needs to be so stringent
that cooperation will be functionally impossible (Larson, 1997, p. 8). Even if cooperation
140 does take place, a state might still worry that the other state will take advantage of the
recent reduction in tensions, particularly if defection is more costly later in the game
(Larson, 1997, p. 9).
Another way to understand the problem of trusting under the condition of anarchy is
through the concept of a security dilemma (Booth & Wheeler, 2008; Herz, 1950; Jervis,
145 1978). Attempts by states to make themselves feel more secure could lead other states to
feel less secure. As Booth and Wheeler show, states witnessing such activity, for instance
a military build-up, face two dilemmas. First, they must interpret whether the increased
military capabilities are a result of defensive or offensive intentions, and second, they
must decide how to respond (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, pp. 4–5).
150 The high costs of misinterpreting the other state’s intentions means that both states
can fall into a security spiral where ever greater resources are spent on defence, but
neither state feels more secure because of the insecurity generated by the parallel attempts
of the other to become secure (Jervis, 1976, pp. 58–113; Kydd, 2005, p. 13; Kydd &
Walter, 2006, p. 57). This is classically demonstrated in arms races, but can also apply to
155 phenomena such as the late 19th century competition for colonies or the desire of France
to keep Germany weak after the First World War. In the security dilemma two states
might have no hostile intentions, and yet, due to the lack of trust, could still end up in a
dangerous situation that neither wanted.
Anarchy in the international system also exacerbates domestic factors that can
160 undermine the formation of trusting relationships between states. Those holding
antagonistic views of other states use the uncertainty inherent to anarchy to reinforce
their arguments. John Tirman (2009) demonstrates the power of such adversarial
narratives on the example of the highly contentious US-Iranian relationship since 1979.
Additionally, domestic elites can achieve internal unification and consolidation of power
165 by projecting the image of the hostile outside environment.
Trust and trusting relationships in international politics are therefore marked by a
considerable structural pressure. Trust researchers outside international relations rarely
consider this pressure because they typically examine processes within hierarchical
realms. However, the nature and effects of international anarchy can be interpreted in
170 various ways. Famously, Alexander Wendt argues that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’
(Wendt, 1992). This means that states have some control over the characteristics of the
international system in which they operate. Depending on their actions, the international
realm does not have to be characterised by unmitigated competition, which opens up the
possibility of forging trusting relationships.
175 The effects of anarchy are disputed. What is indisputable is the difference between the
anarchical international realm and hierarchical domestic settings. Mistrust can become a
self-fulfilling prophecy in both environments, but its consequences are far more dire in
the former. It is therefore important that a growing number of studies have suggested both
theoretical and empirical possibilities of trusting relationships between states. For
180 instance, scholars have shown the importance of trust in the founding of the United
States and the European Community (Hoffman, 2006); Argentine-Brazilian nuclear
cooperation (Wheeler, 2009); attempts to broker better relations between India and
Pakistan (Wheeler, 2010); in the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Booth &
4 J. Ruzicka and V. Keating
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Wheeler, 2008; Hoffman, 2006); or in the relationship between France and Germany
185 following the Second World War (Brugger, Hasenclever, & Kasten, 2013a). The
structural condition of anarchy cannot be used to rule out the possibility of trusting
relationships a priori. Instead, its effects should be studied further, applying appropriate
insights from the broader trust research.
Trust in international relations: An overview of research
190 The basic methodological question any review article must answer concerns the way in
which it systematises the body of literature under its scrutiny. Is it more preferable to
adopt a chronological or a typological approach? Each choice carries its own advantages
and disadvantages. Chronological presentation can offer an evolutionary perspective on
the development of the literature, demonstrating connections and influences between
195 subsequent contributions. Grounded in the cumulative view of knowledge production, it
can properly recognise the role of the initial explorers while at the same time pointing out
the state-of-the-art research. But would it be a useful organising tool for those instances
when a body of literature has expanded rapidly within a short period of time and one can
only identify at best weak cumulative tendencies? For such occasions, the typological
200 approach seems to be more appropriate. It allows for grouping research according to
conceptual, theoretical or methodological criteria, reflecting the actual choices made by
various researchers. This enables one to spot tendencies in the literature even without any
as yet apparent lineage. There is, however, a price to pay, namely the possibility of
disagreement about the typological criteria. Why, for instance, should the literature be
205 divided on conceptual rather than methodological grounds?
Mindful of these difficulties, this review essay adopts the typological approach. It will
be apparent to the readers that the research on trust produced in the field of international
relations has grown very quickly. Thus, while there are some historical legacies and early
pioneers to be acknowledged, much of the literature has sprung up nearly simultaneously.
210 This greatly diminishes the primary strength of the chronological presentation – the
ability to show the action and reaction among various strands of the literature. An
additional reason for our preference is the fact that this allows us to map the strands of
trust research in international relations back onto the main research threads in trust
studies. In short, we can trace sources on which international relations scholars have
215 drawn. Opting for the typological approach is a subjective, though not unreasoned, choice
on our part. Other authors might choose differently. As the research in this area continues,
there will likely be increased opportunities for telling a different, more chronologically
evolutionary story of trust research in international politics.
Our main criterion for grouping the contributions typologically together is the way in
220 which the various authors treat the key concept of trust. On this basis we outline three
main approaches to the study of trust in relations among states. The first theorises trust as
a type of rational choice calculation. The second understands trust as a social
phenomenon. The third considers trust in its psychological dimensions. Each approach
is typically, but not exclusively, connected with specific theoretical and methodological
225 choices which we note. But we consider the particular conceptualisations of trust as the
most distinctive feature; hence they provide the basis for our typology.
Journal of Trust Research 5
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Trust as a rational choice calculation
Rational choice theory has long informed a strong tradition within the study of
international relations. It attempts to offer a solution to the problems of uncertainty and
230 commitment, which states encounter under the conditions of international anarchy, by
examining their expectations and preferences within matrices of rationally calculable pay-
offs. This approach relies heavily on formal modelling and, in some early instances, on
laboratory behavioural experiments. The pioneering research exploring the role of trust in
this manner was conducted by Morton Deutsch and his collaborators in the late 1950s.
235 Working with the basic game theoretical model of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Deutsch
(1958, p. 270) made a powerful argument that ‘there is no possibility for “rational”
behaviour in it [the game] unless the conditions for mutual trust exist’. Trust is the actor’s
expectation of an occurrence (M. Deutsch, 1958, p. 266), in this case, the non-defection
of the other prisoner, which effectively solves the dilemma making cooperation the
240 dominant strategy.2 While it did not articulate any explicit connection to international
politics of the day, the article formulated hypotheses – concerning the role of
communication, power and the third parties in establishing or hindering the development
of trust – which were imminently applicable to the international arena.
A more explicit attempt to consider the role of trust in specifically international
245 questions, such as the formation and maintenance of alliances or the reliability of arms
control agreements, came several years later from Bernhardt Lieberman (1964). Lieber-
man was perhaps the first scholar to clearly identify what have become the two dominant
views on trust in the study of international relations – one arguing that to trust is
dangerous and states can ill afford it, the other claiming that international conflicts are
250 intractable because of the lack of trust. He rejected the ‘personal-moral’ perspective on
trust as impractical in international politics and instead put forward the notion of ‘trust
based on interest’ (Lieberman, 1964, p. 273). Lieberman tried to coin the rather
cumbersome ‘i-trust’ label, combining his notions of interest and trust, which did not
catch on. The conceptualisation stressed the recognition of the necessity to ‘form a stable,
255 continuing alliance, because such a situation often yields the greatest payoff to the
members of the coalition’ (Lieberman, 1964, p. 279). Its emphasis on trusting and being
trustworthy out of one’s own as well as the other’s interest makes Lieberman’s ideas
similar to Russell Hardin’s well-known conceptualisation of trust as encapsulated interest
(Hardin, 2002).
260 Lieberman’s thinking was novel in aligning the concept of trust specifically with
rational choice theory. This move, however, also likely accounts for the lack of interest in
trust during the ensuing decades. If there was no normative dimension to the concept, no
personal or moral consideration, was it really necessary to operate with the concept of
trust, instead of more sophisticated game-theoretical models demonstrating the preferred
265 pay-off structures? Thus perhaps the two most seminal works in international relations
inspired by rational choice theory – Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation and
Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony – despite exploring much the same questions, and
even using some of the models applied by Deutsch and Lieberman, do not work with the
concept of trust at all (Axelrod, 1990; Keohane, 1984).3 Remarkably, Axelrod goes so far
270 as to tout as one of the encouraging findings of his cooperation theory the fact that ‘there
is no need to assume trust between the players’ (Axelrod, 1990, p. 174).
The rational choice conceptualisation of trust received a major impetus from the work
of Andrew Kydd beginning in the late 1990s. Through a series of articles and a book, he
became undoubtedly the most prominent rational choice theorist of trust within
6 J. Ruzicka and V. Keating
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275 international relations. Building on the work of sociologist James Coleman, Kydd defines
trust in three ways throughout his work. First, as the ‘estimate of how likely it is that the
other is status quo oriented, rather than revisionist’ (Kydd, 2001, p. 810). This reflects the
perennial concern in international politics whether states will be content with the existing
world order,4 such as the United States in the post-cold war period, or whether states will
280 try to fundamentally change it, as for instance Germany’s attempt to do so between the
two world wars. The presence of revisionist states is bound with a greater likelihood of
conflict precisely because their motivation to change the existing order makes them prone
to defection and untrustworthy behaviour.
Second, trust for Kydd (2005, p. 3) is ‘a belief that the other side is trustworthy, that
285 is, willing to reciprocate cooperation’. This touches on fundamental questions such as
whether and how states might generate gains from mutually advantageous arrangements
when simultaneously facing the possibility of cheating and defection. The classical
example is arms control negotiations and agreements, where both sides would benefit
from limiting their military expenses, but must be alert to the other side gaining the upper
290 hand in the relationship if it managed to circumvent the agreed restrictions.5
Finally, Kydd (2010, p. 2680) defines trust as ‘having confidence that one’s interests
are not in too much conflict with the other side’. Two states coveting the same territory, as
is the case, for example, in the on-going territorial disputes between China and Japan in
the East China Sea, are unlikely to trust each other. Though all these definitions are
295 somewhat different, what ties them together is the idea that trust is a rational prediction
about the nature or characteristics of the other state, be they its status quo orientation, the
willingness to reciprocate cooperation or the compatibility of its interests. In all instances,
the importance of trust rests in its direct contribution to the success or failure of
international cooperation.6
300 Kydd’s main input is his conceptualisation of trust as relating to more than a
Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. Instead of the narrow focus on that game, he proposes two
complications. First, he adds uncertainty about the preferences of the other party into the
calculation. Second, he argues that trust is not simply a belief about the probability that
the other side will cooperate, but a belief about the preferences of the other side, be they
305 either Prisoner’s Dilemma or Assurance Game preferences.7 A belief that the other state
has Prisoner’s Dilemma preferences makes it untrustworthy, while a belief that the other
state has Assurance Game preferences makes it trustworthy. The importance of the
distinction between a belief about the preferences of the other side instead of a belief
about the mere probability of cooperation is that it helps to understand why even
310 trustworthy actors sometimes fail to cooperate (Kydd, 2005, pp. 9–11). As Kydd (2005,
p. 11) puts it, ‘Hitler might think Britain the most trustworthy state in the world, and yet
realize that the likelihood that Churchill will cooperate with him is zero’.
From the rational choice perspective, the problem of mistrust at the international level
therefore ultimately boils down to whether Assurance Game actors believe that the other
315 side may have Prisoner’s Dilemma preferences (Kydd, 2005, pp. 6–8). Kydd proceeds to
define the level of trust that one actor has in relation to the other as the probability that the
first actor assumes the other actor to be trustworthy. Cooperation is possible only when
the level of trust exceeds a minimum trust threshold for each party, which is defined as
the range of probabilities of trust where the expected value of cooperation is positive
320 (Kydd, 2005, p. 9). Crucially, in international politics this range is influenced by external
factors. For instance, in situations where the costs of conflict are high and the advantage
of first strikes low, there will be a low minimum threshold of trust necessary for
cooperation (Kydd, 2005, p. 41). A good example is the relationship between the United
Journal of Trust Research 7
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States and the Soviet Union during the cold war once both sides secured the capability to
325 retaliate to any nuclear strike launched by the other side. The costs of conflict were
extremely high, equalling practically to a total destruction, while the advantages of
initiating a nuclear exchange were small because the other side retained the ability to
inflict massive damage.
If states find themselves in a situation where large external pressures inhibit trust –
330 Kydd calls this a noncooperative equilibrium – there is no possibility of cooperation
because both security-seeking and revisionist states will do the same thing, defect. These
situations matter not only because they automatically produce defection, but also because
it is impossible for Assurance Game actors to differentiate between Assurance Game and
Prisoner’s Dilemma actors. There is no possibility of learning the other’s type.
335 Alternatively, in a cooperative equilibrium, or what Kydd terms a separating equilibrium,
the external conditions allow Assurance Game actors to cooperate, and therefore they can
begin to distinguish the other’s type through the process of iterative learning (Kydd,
2005, p. 42). Kydd showed the analytical purchase of this model in his examination of the
end of the cold war, where the United States and the Soviet Union were able to ‘get
340 cooperation going by setting up an initial round to test the waters’ (Kydd, 2005, p. 204).
Kydd’s creative application of the rational choice definition of trust elucidates two
fundamental problems of interstate relations: (1) under what structural conditions might
states trust, and therefore cooperate; (2) how these structural conditions can affect the
learning processes about other state’s type. Despite these significant contributions, several
345 questions arise. Does the rational choice conceptualisation of trust simply equate to
cooperation? In other words, is there a risk of misunderstanding the role of trust in
international politics, because this model implies that where there is cooperation, there
ought to be trust? If this is the case, one might ask how does the concept of trust advance
the highly developed rational choice literature about cooperation? Perhaps more
350 importantly, is the rational choice conceptualisation of trust powerful enough to disregard
the potential social dynamics of trust in international relations? States and their
representatives are not fully rational actors in pursuit of the best pay-offs, irrespective
of their efforts to convey such image (Mercer, 2013). It is, nevertheless, a testament to the
contribution of the rational choice conceptualisation of trust that these questions could not
355 be posed without it.
Trust as a social phenomenon
The end of the cold war brought a renewed emphasis on the role of ideas and social
processes in the study of international relations.8 Crucial in this regard was the difficulty
of explaining the waning of the superpower confrontation in the absence of any
360 significant change in the underlying distribution of material capabilities between the
competitors. This was a surprising outcome, for major changes in international politics
had long been expected to come as a result of an accumulation of resources followed by
war. The end of the cold war led many observers to look for explanation beyond the pay-
off matrices and material interests of states. Rather than holding on to the logic of
365 expected consequences, where actors achieve cooperation by bargaining about the
distribution of pay-offs on the basis of their pre-existing interests, scholars began to
examine more seriously the role of the logic of appropriateness in the international system
(March & Olsen, 1998). This research emphasises the relationship between rules and
identities. Cooperation is a result of compatible identities and behaviour following
370 appropriate rules (March & Olsen, 1998, pp. 951–952). Such a view of international
8 J. Ruzicka and V. Keating
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politics provides important possibilities for the study of trust in relations among states,
because it incorporates the social and relational dynamics between actors.
Accordingly, scholars who study trust as a social phenomenon tend to begin their
analyses by defining trust as confidence in expectations that others will ‘do what is right’
375 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 20). They typically draw on seminal contributions to trust research
such as those of Bernard Barber (1983), Martin Hollis (1998) or Eric Uslaner (2002). The
contrast with the rational choice position is stark. The trustor AQ4is not merely a rational actor
placing a bet on the behaviour of others, but proceeds on the belief that ‘trustees have a
responsibility to fulfil the trust placed in them even if it means sacrificing some of their
380 own benefits’ (Hoffman, 2002, p. 379). Aaron Hoffman argues that this perspective,
which he calls the fiduciary approach, distinguishes the concept of trust from the broader
category of risk. He notes the distinction is empirically justified, for we judge others as
‘upright’ or ‘honourable’, and not just ‘a good bet’ (Hoffman, 2002, p. 381). As Charles
Kegley and Raymond Gregory stress in their exploratory study of trust in international
385 alliances, ‘to keep peace, allies would be advised to keep promises’ (Kegley & Raymond,
1990, p. 263).
A similar position has been articulated by Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler who note
the rational choice approach overlooks the human factor, or the ‘feelings and attachments’
that grow between leaders (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, pp. 145–158). A typical example is
390 the relationship between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid- to late
1980s, which is said to have facilitated the peaceful end of the cold war. Nicholas
Wheeler (2010) later applied the same lenses to the ultimately unsuccessful trust-building
process between India’s Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and his Pakistani opposite
Nawaz Sharif. Both instances highlight the personal and emotional basis of trust, the
395 critical role of the ‘leap in the dark’ involved in trusting, and the idea that trust is an
ongoing two-way relationship (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 232).
The expectation others will do what is right, however, does not automatically bind
those being trusted to particular actions. Trust is relational precisely because no matter
what one does, it cannot be imposed on others. In trust research, this argument is
400 articulated by Claus Offe (1999, p. 43), who cautions that trust ‘cannot easily be brought
into being through strategic action’. Within the context of the study of international
politics, Aaron Hoffman likewise argues that, while ‘trustors create trusting relationships;
trustees determine the success of these relationships’ (Hoffman, 2006, p. 22).
Taking both risk and obligation into account, the behavioural manifestation of trust is
405 what Hoffman (2002, p. 377) calls a trusting relationship. This concept presupposes a
social structure, where actors interact in more or less dense webs of meaning. As such,
trusting relationships must include not only the idea of risk, but also the idea of obligation
(Hoffman, 2002, p. 376). Additionally, social trust theorists interpret the act when trustors
place their trust in trustees less as an outcome of ‘the certainty produced when actors bind
410 themselves to particular outcomes’, but more as stemming ‘out of an essential faith’
(Hoffman, 2006, p. 7).
It seems to us, however, that scholars of international relations favouring the notions
of the ‘leap’ or ‘faith’ would be better served by following Guido Möllering’s concept of
suspension. Suspension, conceived ‘as the process that enables actors to deal with
415 irreducible uncertainty and vulnerability’, serves the same function as the leap of faith
(Möllering, 2006, p. 110). But it is based on a combination of ‘reason, routine, and
reflexivity’, all of which are more likely to appeal to policy- and decision-makers who
typically strive to project the image of rational and calculating actors who are not
swayed by emotions. In this regard, the exploratory study of the post-Second World War
Journal of Trust Research 9
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420 Franco-German relationship offered by Philipp Brugger, Andreas Hasenclever and Lukas
Kasten holds important insights. Working directly with Möllering’s notion of suspending
uncertainty, they demonstrate how trust creates a positive perception bias (Brugger et al.,
2013a, pp. 443–444). The suspension of uncertainty becomes important in understanding
states’ responses to crisis situations. If the relationship was characterised by a low level of
425 trust prior to a crisis, states will either cease cooperation or opt for increased control.
However, if the relationship was marked by a higher level of trust, states will opt for
greater policy integration, which is likely to further advance the process of trust-building.
The virtuous effects of trust at the international level are thus plain to see.
Similarly to Hoffman’s use of obligation, Ruzicka and Wheeler, in what they call a
430 binding approach to trust, focus on the centrality of promises and their role in establishing
and maintaining a trusting relationship. They argue that in such a relationship actors will
honour their promises even if they have something to gain from defecting, based on the
fact that ‘they value both its existence and continuation’ (Ruzicka & Wheeler, 2010, p.
73). This allows Ruzicka and Wheeler to explain the persistence of the nuclear non-
435 proliferation treaty (NPT) despite the fact that it created massive power and status
disparities between the five recognised nuclear weapon states and all the other signatories
who agreed to forego the acquisition of atomic weapons.
The analytical contribution of conceptualising trust as a belief that the other will ‘do
what is right’ is significant. It enables observers to identify trusting relationships with a
440 greater degree of precision. For instance, from the rationalist perspective the nuclear
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States during the cold war could be
understood as trusting since both countries predicted that the other would not launch their
nuclear weapons under conditions of uncertainty (Hoffman, 2002, p. 379). However, the
absurdity of classifying that relationship as trusting is readily apparent, given the extent of
445 hostility and animosity which it entailed. Conceptualisations of trust based merely on
predictability of actions simply cannot differentiate between trust and other factors such
as coercion or deterrence, which might also encourage actors to take risks. As Hoffman
(2002, p. 381) puts it, ‘trust implies risk, but risk-taking does not necessarily imply trust’.
By introducing the notions of obligation or bond, scholars can differentiate between trust
450 and the broader category of risk.
The concept of trusting relationship is also explored by Keating and Ruzicka (2014),
who use it to demonstrate the difference between the concepts of trust and confidence.
Drawing on the work of Niklas Luhmann (1979), specifically his contention that trust
allows actors to cognitively reduce or eliminate the overall amount of risk and
455 uncertainty, Keating and Ruzicka (2014, p. 754) pose a crucial question for the students
of international politics: ‘How can one identify a trusting relationship between two
states?’ To answer the question, they propose to focus on whether and how states adopt
or decline hedging strategies vis-à-vis other states. To have a trusting relationship leads
states not to hedge against the potentially negative consequences of other’s actions
460 because such actions are cognitively considered to be zero within a trusting relationship.
They argue that the assessment of the intentions of the other state, found in both
rationalist and some social theories of trust, should properly be labelled confidence. The
important difference between these two concepts is that, ‘confidence does not reduce the
perception of risk, trust does’ (Keating & Ruzicka, 2014, p. 756). This approach carries
465 two advantages when analysing trusting relationships. First, it offers the opportunity to
examine them without relying either on actors’ assertions or the logically convoluted
notions of a ‘leap of faith’ or the ‘acceptance of vulnerability’. Second, it opens up the
possibility of process-tracing the formation of such relationships over longer periods of
10 J. Ruzicka and V. Keating
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time. Therefore, it takes seriously the habitual nature of trust underpinning the social
470 approach.9
However, the question of how much the social approach adds to the rationalist
understanding of trust remains. Various authors might claim that the social aspect of trust is
important, but does this merely add to the value of the trusting relationship in the
calculation of the actors? For instance, despite stressing the importance of social obligation,
475 Hoffman still falls back on the trustors’ perceptions of the trustees to fulfil the obligation,
just like a rationalist scholar would. The difference is the nature of the obligation itself.
States trust because they ‘have the belief that their trustees are obliged to fulfil their trust’
and that ‘trustworthy individuals are those deemed likely to uphold the obligations that our
trust bestows upon them’ (Hoffman, 2006, p. 22).
480 The connection between the rationalist and social camps is perhaps most apparent in
the work of Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler. Their conceptualisation of trust spans both
the rationalist and social approaches, moving between trust as predictability and trust as a
bond. Thus, a minimalist conception of trust is the belief based on the mutual
interpretation of each other’s behaviour that the other state can be relied upon not to
485 act in ways that will be injurious to the interests or values of the first state. A maximalist
conception of trust, on the other hand, becomes apparent when actors mutually attempt to
promote each other’s values and interests (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 229). Though
Booth and Wheeler attempt to link the two approaches, it is unclear from their
explanation how trust can be transformed from an expectation to a personal bond.
490 Nicholas Wheeler’s most recent work emphasises the role of empathy developed between
top policy-makers during face-to-face summits (Wheeler, 2013). While interpersonal
communication is clearly central to the process of empathising, it remains to be
established whether this is a more generally valid explanation of interstate trust-
building.10
495 The questions concerning a coherent conceptualisation of trust notwithstanding,
Booth and Wheeler make an important contribution in their emphasis on the fact that
trust, even in international politics, can be present and operate at several levels. For
instance, trust might only exist at the elite level between leaders, as when the process of
the Franco-German reconciliation began in the 1950s and 1960s, or it might become
500 embedded widely within political units when trusting relationships are replicated at the
broad societal levels, as when the same process of reconciliation continued in the decades
after (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 230; Brugger et al., 2013a; Keating & Wheeler, 2013).
In this regard, Booth and Wheeler introduce to the study of trust among states the
perennial problem of the levels of analysis (Singer, 1961), something that trust
505 researchers ought to take seriously.
Trust as a psychological phenomenon
The question of the appropriate level of analysis is of fundamental importance to the final
approach to the study of trust in international politics, which treats trust as psychological
phenomenon. In the interplay between agents and structures, scholars adopting this line of
510 inquiry favour the individual actors who act on behalf of collective units such as states.
They argue that the rational approach, and to a lesser degree also the social approach,
miss the key point of trust, which is how its psychological dimension produces particular
effects. Psychological predispositions and emotions of actors therefore take a prominent
role and must be investigated with regard to the formation and maintenance of trust
515 between individuals acting on the international stage. Such research is nested within a
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broader approach to international politics, which stresses the significance of psycholo-
gical factors shaping perceptions, judgements and decisions (Jervis, 1976; Mercer, 1996).
The idea of treating trust in international politics as a psychological phenomenon was
first developed in depth by Deborah Welch Larson in her analysis of the US-Soviet
520 relations during the cold war. Published in the late 1990s, her book foreshadowed the
wave of interest in the study of trust within the field of international relations. While
Larson begins with a rational choice framework by explicitly borrowing her conceptua-
lisation of trust from economists – trust is the ‘subjective probability that the other will
perform an action upon which the success of one’s own decision depends and in a context
525 where one must decide before the other’s behavior can be monitored’ (Larson, 1997,
p. 12) – she adds a psychological dimension, arguing that trust is different from mere
expectations for two reasons. First, trust creates a sense of regret in the poor decision, not
just mere disappointment. Second, misplaced trust generates a moral outrage not present
in decisions driven purely from rational expectations (Larson, 1997, p. 19). From the
530 psychological perspective trust includes predictability, credibility and good intentions.
Curiously, Larson demonstrates the importance of trust negatively, by tracing several
instances where mistrust prevented cooperation between the United States and the Soviet
Union, even when they shared interests and preferences. Deploying the counterfactual
method, she shows how trust, as opposed to mistrust, would have made a difference in
535 their various dealings. Additionally, she demonstrates how mistrust was rooted in
ideological beliefs, cognitive biases and historical narratives, which made it extremely
difficult to overcome entrenched perceptions. To trust, actors must interpret others’
actions and such interpretations are impossible without psychological factors such as
beliefs and images. This further reinforces the importance of individuals when it comes to
540 the study of trust in international politics.
Another group of scholars study trust from an individual psychological perspective,
but do so by focussing on the link between emotions and trust. Jonathan Mercer (2005, p.
95), for instance, argues that trust is ‘a feeling of optimism in another’s goodwill and
competence’. This feeling goes beyond the observable evidence presented to an agent,
545 where ‘people give the benefit of the doubt to those they trust, and doubt anything
beneficial done by those they distrust’ (Mercer, 2005, p. 95). Drawing on social identity
theory, Mercer claims that identity produces an emotion that creates trust, which then can
be used to solve collective action problems. It is this strong feeling of group identity that
leads to cooperation, sharing, the perception of the mutuality of interests and a
550 willingness to sacrifice particular individual interests for group interests.
Mercer (2005, p. 96) argues that trusting individuals will cooperate even when they
know that others within the identity group are defecting, and will not leave the group
even if it is in their interest to do so. But the benefit of the link between identity and trust
that stabilises these relationships also creates problems. If trust relies on identity, then this
555 could lead to an automatic discrimination between insiders and outsiders. As Mercer
(2005, p. 97) puts it, ‘in-group trust does not require out-group distrust – which is a
feeling of pessimism about another’s goodwill and competence – but it does require one
to distinguish between trusting one’s group and not trusting an out-group’.11 Recognising
the role of emotion in trust might help us to understand how distinct groups form larger
560 collectives, such as security communities whose members share a ‘we-feeling’, and why
trusting relationships form so rarely (Mercer, 2005, pp. 97–98).
Booth and Wheeler, drawing on Mercer, offer a way of addressing the in-group vs.
out-group problem. They note that one of the characteristics of trust is empathy and
bonding, or actors’ ability to ‘internalise the hopes and fears of another by imaginatively
12 J. Ruzicka and V. Keating
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565 taking on as far as possible their emotions/feelings and psychological realities’,
particularly an ability to empathise with fear (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 237). Naomi
Head (2012, pp. 37–38) likewise argues that decisions to trust are not purely rational.
Some decisions to trust against the odds, or distrust despite the odds, can be explained by
examining the emotions underlying the situation. She suggests two potential sources of
570 change leading to trusting relationships – either new evidence as to the type of actor one
is facing becomes available, or, crucially in the psychological context, actors consciously
exercise empathy (Head, 2012, p. 38). The ability to empathise with the fear of others
opens up the door to the creation of trusting relationships.
A different take on the emotional character of trust is put forward by Torsten Michel
575 (Michel, 2013). Following the argument of Bernd Lahno (2001), he claims that scholars
of international relations should distinguish between reliance (strategic trust) and trust
(moralistic trust). In this view, calculative interactions are best characterised as reliance,
whereas trust is ‘a moralistic, emotive attitude’ (Michel, 2013, p. 870). Michel argues that
trust forms part of practical knowledge which serves as background to actors’ actions.
580 Because of this emotive, dispositional quality towards others, instances of misplaced trust
result in feelings of betrayal rather than mere disappointment. Whereas the argument
makes for a decisive critique of trust-building efforts – ‘re-establishing trust cannot be
engineered’ (Michel, 2013, p. 883) – additional application to international politics is not
apparent and remains yet to be worked out.
585 One way of doing so is suggested in the rich work of Brian Rathbun, who argues that
psychology is important because it shapes statespersons’ general propensity to trust in
others.12 Thus, while he keeps a rationalist definition of trust as the ‘belief that
cooperation will be reciprocated’ (Rathbun, 2012b, p. 2), he shows how actors who tend
to view others as untrustworthy favour unilateralism in foreign policy, whereas those
590 generally inclined to trust are more willing to advocate multilateralism. In other words,
Rathbun (2012b, p. 3) is interested in the phenomenon of ‘generalised’ trust, which is
produced by the disposition of the statesperson, and how it is differentiated from strategic
trust.
Working closely with Eric Uslaner’s research, Rathbun (2012b, pp. 24–25) claims
595 that generalised trust is ‘moralistic’ because it is based on an assessment of the general
benevolent character and honesty of others, and not simply an assessment of their
interests. Trust is ‘ideological in nature, rooted in a broader worldview about the nature of
social relations’ (Rathbun, 2012b, p. 3). Generalised trusters tend to create international
institutions with more binding commitments, less flexibility and more members, unlike
600 generalised non-trusters who will prefer limited commitments, vetoes and opt-out clauses
(Rathbun, 2012b, p. 6). Rathbun notes that in the United States, generalised trusters and
non-trusters can be roughly mapped onto the social psychology of the left and the right.
This offers an answer to why some states have Prisoner’s Dilemma preferences and others
Assurance Game preferences, a question unresolved in Andrew Kydd’s work. Variation in
605 generalised trust means that different political actors can see their strategic environment
quite differently though they find themselves in the same situation (Rathbun, p. xiii).
This finding is important because without the notion of generalised trusters it is
difficult to understand why cooperation in multilateral settings would start in the first
place. The presence of generalised trusters answers the questions of how and why states
610 initiate cooperation without adequate information about the other states, and how they
sustain cooperation amidst inconsistent behaviour or when interactions are infrequent. It
also explains why large international organisations keep functioning given an almost
certain divergence of interests among states and explains diffuse reciprocity over time
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(Rathbun, 2012b, pp. 17–19). For example, Rathbun’s case studies elucidate why the
615 United States stayed outside of the League of Nations after the First World War as well as
why the United States took an active part in shaping the United Nations and NATO
following the Second World War.
Conceptualising trust as a psychological phenomenon makes intuitive sense even in
international politics. After all, states and organisations are represented by individual
620 human beings who trust or distrust their counterparts and interlocutors. The role of high-
ranking officials is clearly important independent of prevailing social structures,
particularly if they can successfully break the current framing of the issue through their
agency.13 Nevertheless, a question remains as to whether the psychological approaches
discount the structural constraints that individuals in these roles face both domestically
625 and internationally.
The future of trust research in international relations
Which directions, then, should the study of trust in international relations take in the
future? Individual researchers will maintain a range of original venues to examine and we
do not wish to prescribe any common agenda. However, we would like to outline three
630 broad areas that we believe deserve the particular attention of trust researchers in the field
of international relations and beyond – the processes of trust-building; the ways in which
it could be demonstrated whether bilateral, regional or even global trusting relationships
are becoming more/less robust; and finally the normative desirability of trusting
relationships among states.
635 Much of the increased profile that the study of trust has received in international
relations is the product of practitioner interest in conflict resolution. Although major wars
between great powers might be the thing of the past due to the effect of nuclear weapons
and the increased destructiveness of conventional armaments, the use of force to solve
political disputes has not abated. Whether trust can be built among adversaries and, if so,
640 how, is a question of great importance. Is Torsten Michel’s scepticism about trust-building
processes warranted or can conditions conducive to such processes be uncovered in the
ways envisaged by Nicholas Wheeler? We need carefully articulated hypotheses – is it the
case, for example, that accepting vulnerability can build trust? – and well-designed
studies, be they individual, large-N or comparative, to test what seems to have been
645 accepted by many scholars of trust in international relations. Evidence supporting the idea
that trust can be actively built is scarce and anecdotal rather than systematic. Do model
instances such as the interaction between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev tend to
discount the presence of various safety nets which significantly lessened the ascribed
vulnerability faced by actors and states which they represented?14 On the more
650 conceptual side, those interested in trust-building should say clearly what actually
characterises a process of trust-building. All too frequently, such processes are merely
equated with increased cooperation. But, especially from the point of view of social and
psychological approaches, cooperation alone cannot be enough to signify a trusting
relationship.
655 Closely related to the previous point is the need to devise better tools for identifying
trusting relationships and their robustness. As Keating and Ruzicka ask, how do we know
something is a trusting relationship to begin with? Signs of cooperation and actors’
proclamations have inherent limits. The former can be achieved without trust; the latter
can simply be self-deceptions or, worse, lies. The need to identify trusting relationships is
660 important because, once achieved, scholars can start to think in a systematic manner
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about questions concerning how trust between states might be generated or maintained.15
Until then, we do not actually know whether we are dealing with the relevant cases. We
might be trying to learn about apples while examining oranges. Keating and Ruzicka
propose to focus on the extent of hedging strategies adopted by states. This indicator has
665 broad applicability and could be used in bilateral, regional as well as global settings.
Though the most obvious way how to conceive hedging is in terms of military
preparedness and expenditure, hedging strategies could be operationalised in a number
of ways. But, critically, does their approach rely too much on material indicators?
The identification of trusting relationships is also important to the research on security
670 communities, that is, groups of states among whom war is unthinkable. Although the
existing literature references trust as a variable, it subsumes trust as part of the mutual
identity that forms between states in a security community. Scholars might want to ask
the question of whether trust should be studied independently of identity formation.16 In
other words, do the formation and strengthening of trusting relationships precede the
675 construction of the ‘we-feeling’ characteristic of a security community? If so, this would
contribute to the recent debates over whether there exist interstate relationships that have
the properties of security communities but lack the ‘we-ness’ central to the original theory
(Pouliot, 2007). More importantly, it would mean that heterogeneous groups could form a
global security community where war between all states becomes unthinkable.
680 The research on security communities also demonstrates the methodological pluralism
that scholars can bring to bear in the study of the robustness of trusting relationships. On
the one hand, trust researchers might deploy the tools examining frequency, density and
content of communication networks, as laid out by Karl Deutsch, who is inextricably
linked with the concept of security community (K. W. Deutsch et al., 1957). These
685 methods favour a large-N approach and can explore the general patterns of trust and
distrust within world politics. Alternatively, there are methods connected with the study
of security communities as everyday practices, notably explored by Vincent Pouliot
(2008). These methods favour case studies and historical process tracing where variables
are not easily quantifiable. These methods are also useful to explore the causal processes
690 in a case study that falls outside of expected patterns. The strengths and weaknesses of
both types of approaches are well documented.17 We believe that there is no a priori
reason to choose between them, as either approach could help to generate indicators that
allow scholars to make claims about the existence and quality of trusting relationships
across time. The crucial factor in making this choice is whether the method is suited to
695 answer the research question asked.
Trust scholars in international relations should also examine complex relationships
where trust varies across different issue areas. For instance, two states might have a high
level of trust in their strategic partnership, but far less in their economic relations. The
example of the relationship between the United States and Japan springs to mind here.
700 Does a change in the level of trust in one area spill over to others? Is it the case that
trusting relationships need to be formed in some areas first before they can be established
elsewhere? Empirically, this might be an interesting research topic for European
integration scholars.
Finally, scholars studying trust at the international level should not shy away from
705 fully exploring the question of the normative desirability of trust in interstate relations. To
compensate for the traditional dismissal of trust, the recent wave of scholarship has tried
to demonstrate the possibility and appeal of trust. The normative case for the
development of trusting relationships is strong, precisely because some of the most
pressing problems facing humanity require solutions that cannot be adopted without trust.
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710 Moreover, whatever arrangements states agree on to tackle such issues as climate change
or resource depletion might depend on more than interpersonal bonds of trust between
leaders. Measures will take years to adopt and will have to be maintained for decades,
spanning well beyond the time-frame of most office holders in most states. Under those
conditions, trusting relationships will need to be formed between collectivities. The case
715 for the normative desirability of trust at the interstate level cannot be based merely on
empirical illustrations. A full-fledged normative argument grounded in a general view of
international politics is required. It is possible that it will show the degree of enthusiasm
for trust in international politics needs to be toned down. Such a finding, however, would
not be a reason to abandon the study of trust and trusting relationships in international
720 politics. On the contrary, it would allow trust researchers to explore the subject with a
better sense of limitations and the promise it holds.
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730 Notes
1. A group of states among whom warfare becomes unthinkable is known as a security
community (Adler & Barnett, 1998; K. W. Deutsch et al., 1957).
2. Importantly, Deutsch differentiates the expectation associated with trust from other types of
expectations. Deutsch notes that trust ‘leads to behavior which he [the actor] perceives to have
735 greater negative motivational consequences if the expectation is not confirmed than positive
motivational consequences if it is confirmed’, where motivational consequences are defined as
events that change, or prevent a change, in the welfare of the individual (M. Deutsch, 1958,
p. 266).
3. See also their joint-authored article (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985).
740 4. (Carr, 1939; Davidson, 2006; Johnston, 2003; Rynning & Ringsmose, 2008).
5. (Adelman, 1984; Kydd, 2012; Meyer, 1984; Talbott, 1984).
6. See also Kydd (2005– 2006, p. 620, 2010, p. 2676).
7. Unlike the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the optimum strategy for both sides is to defect, in the
Assurance Game, the optimum strategy is to cooperate if the other side is likely to cooperate,
745 but to otherwise defect (Kydd, 2005, pp. 7–8).
8. This literature is known in the field as social constructivism. Major works include (Finnemore,
1996; Hopf, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Kratochwil, 1991; Onuf, 1989; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt,
1992, 1999).
9. See also (Hopf, 2010) on habitual thinking in international politics.
750 10. On the problem of who trusts whom in international politics, see Brugger, Hasenclever, &
Kasten (2013b, pp. 90–94).
11. Similarly, Karin Fierke (2009) tries to show on the case of Northern Ireland how exclusive
identity categories hamper the possibility of establishing trust.
12. We refer to Rathbun’s book which largely summarises his findings presented in a series of
755 preceding articles (Rathbun, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a).
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13. Agency is fundamental in any social understanding because, as Roy Bhaskar (1979, p. 174) put
it, ‘nothing happens in society save in virtue of something human beings do or have done’.
14. For instance, some scholars argue that each state’s stock of nuclear weapons shielded the
United States and the Soviet Union from the worst outcomes of a possible defection by the
760 other side in the negotiating process (Kaiser, 1989, p. 136; Kydd, 2000, p. 343; Wheeler, 2012,
p. 8).
15. Of course, there is no necessity that one model will prevail, but the importance here is that
there are at least several competing models and an active academic debate over their strengths
and weaknesses. For additional tentative suggestions see Brugger et al. (2013b, pp. 94–96).
765 16. An initial attempt to tackle this question is offered by Keating & Wheeler (2013).
17. Although the debate over the relative usefulness of large-N quantitative versus case study
qualitative research is almost endless, a few key works are Bull (1966), King, Keohane, &
Verba (1994) and Sayer (1992).
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